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American Populism is irritatingly elusive. O
the past sixty years, since the publication of John D. Hicks' se

Populist Revolt, historians have offered a wide variety of interpret

its ideological thrust, its relationship with previous and subsequen

cal developments, and its dramatic rise and equally dramatic f
Nonetheless, the broad boundaries of historiographical agreeme

disagreement, especially on the question of the reform intent of
ment, can be defined with some precision. Historians generally ag

Populism articulated a comprehensive program of change. They also
agree that the fundamental political message of Populism was the Omaha
Platform, a document drafted at the party's 1892 presidential nominating
convention. The Omaha Platform endorsed sweeping reform in three ar?

eas: land, transportation, and finance. Populists wanted large corporate
grants from the government to railroads reclaimed and distributed to indi?

viduals; government ownership of "natural monopolies" such as rail?
roads, telegraphs, and telephones; and government control of the supply
and quantity of money. This last issue became the party's most significant

political demand. It meant an end to the prevailing gold standard and
dramatic inflation. Congress, not New York bankers, would henceforth
determine the amount of money in circulation.
Historical consensus weakens, however, once one attempts to gauge
the implications ofthe Omaha program. This is particularly true regarding

evidence of how Populism relates to the development of modern corpo-
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1. An excellent survey of recent scholarship is William F. Holmes, "Populism: In Search
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rate capitalism. Some writers have viewed the Platform and other activ

ties of Populists, such as cooperative marketing of agricultural good

evidence that Populism was anticorporate and anticapitalist. According t
Steven Hahn, "To the hegemony of the marketplace, Populism counterposed the vision of a producers' commonwealth achieved through co?
operative enterprise and the public regulation of exchange." Similarly,
Lawrence Goodwyn has suggested that cooperatives allowed Populist
farmers to reject the "prevailing forms of American finance capitalism."
Indeed, "The collapse of Populism meant, in effect, that the cultural values
of the corporate state were politically unassailable in twentieth-century
America." Others, however, do not believe the Populist challenge ran
quite so deep. Bruce Palmer adopted a middle ground by stating that
while Populists did not "question the fundamental tenets ofthe American
economic system as they understood them?the market, supply and de?
mand, private ownership and profit, and the beneficence of economic
competition between small economic units," they also "realized that a
social order which set every person against every other, each group and
class against every other, the Devil take the hindmost, represented only
exploitation to most of its members and would very likely destroy itself
eventually." Similarly, Norman Pollack has recently suggested that Popu?
lism was capitalism, or at least a "democratic" form of capitalism. He has
written that "By incorporating a moral-legal influence into the structure of
society, Populists believed it would be possible for capitalism to realize the
potential for abundance . .. in America."2

One generally neglected aspect of the People's Party that provides a
new perspective on this continuing debate is the relationship between
Populist proposals and the existing "private law" rules of state law. In an
era before the general application of federal constitutional rights to states,
this massive body of judicially administered authority identified the principal economic relationships and obligations among individuals and corporations. State law, therefore, was as much a concrete expression of govern?
ment power and values as more publicly contested issues of national
policy such as the tariff or the national banking system.3 Populist attitudes
2. Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transforma-

tion ofthe Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 282;
Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976), 142, 537; Bruce Palmer, "Man Over Money": The Southern Populist
Critique of American Capitalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 205,
221; Norman Pollack, The Just Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare (Urbana: University
of lllinois Press, 1987), 343. A helpful discussion of the debate as it relates to the Populists is
Holmes, "Populism," 39-45. Allan Kulikoff, "The Transition to Capitalism in Rural America,"
William andMary Quarterly 45 (January, 1989):120, provides a more general evaluation.
3. Two introductory works suggesting the connections between American law and political

development are Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (New York: Simon and
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toward the law directly reflect the context in which the Omaha platform
was offered and given meaning.

Historians have not entirely ignored the legal attitudes of Populists.
Some have suggested that Populists disagreed with prevailing rules. Over
fifty years ago C. Vann Woodward noted that the Georgia Populist,
Thomas E. Watson, an attorney, denounced the current state of law and
described the ancient English common law as a "brutal code of half-naked
savages."4 Condemnation of the celebrated 1890s Supreme Court decisions in Pollock v. Farmers" Loan and Trust Co., United States v. E.C.

Knight and Co., and In Re Debs, which showed the high Court's willingness to overturn legislative reforms, sanction the development of trusts,

and thwart the goals of organized labor, has been cited, as has Populist
criticism of the excessive use of injunctions against unions in labor disputes and the importance of the perceived fealty of the Supreme Court to
monopoly in the presidential election of 1896.5 It is also well-known that
the Farmers' Alliance, the organizational precursor of the Populist party,
specifically excluded attorneys from membership and demanded simplification of local rules of litigation, usually with the aim of reducing the
likelihood of lawyerly artifice.6
Yet the work of other historians indicates a more ambivalent attitude.

Norman Pollack and Michael Brodhead have argued that fundamental

legal rules were not understood by Populists as conflicting with the party's
legislative proposals. In fact, they have indicated that Populists often portrayed the changes offered by their movement as efforts to preserve, not
destroy, ancient principles of government, including presumably fair rules
of law.7

One limitation of earlier Populist legal studies, including those of Pollack
and Brodhead, is that they are based primarily on the traditional sources of
Populism: speeches, newspaper editorials, and election material. As a result, they tend to shed light on Populist criticism, not context. Moreover, the

Schuster, 2d ed., 1985) and Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
4. C Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Oxford University Press,
1963), 171-73.

5. Alan J. Weston, "The Supreme Court, the Populist Movement, and the Election of 1896,"
Journal of Politics 15 (February, 1953):3.
6. Hicks, Populist Revolt, 112; Lala C Steelman, The North Carolina Farmers' A/liance: A
Political History, 1887-1893 (Greenville, North Carolina: East Carolina University Publications in
History, 1985), 161.
7. Pollack, The Just Polity, 141; Michael Brodhead, Persevering Populist: The Life of Frank
Doster (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1969), 114. See also James C. Malin, A Concern
About Humanity: Notes on Reform, 1872-1912, At the National and Kansas Levels of Thought
(Lawrence, Kansas: The Author, 1964), 132-55.
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work that has been done with traditional legal sources, such as the decided
opinionsof a state supreme court, has focusedon Populist judges'interpre-

tations of more obviously political concepts such as voting statutes and
constitutions.8 However useful this kind of analysis may be, it cannot explain Populist attitudestoward rules governing private relations?the domi?
nant concern of state law.

Measuring Populism through judicial opinions presents some methodological complexities not encountered in evaluating Populist legislators or

polemicists. The central problem is that the nature of American judging
confronted Populist judges with two potentially contradictory bases for
decision-making: existing law, or precedent, and the reform agenda of
Populism. Moreover, neither contemporary judges and legal scholars nor
modern legal historians have provided a clear description of just what the
non-Populist law was in the 1890s, or more important, what it intended to
accomplish. Regarding the impetus for the development of legal rules, for
example, some have argued that there is evidence that two leading areas
of the common law, the imposition of liability for negligent acts and the
enforcement of contracts, were characterized by judicially imposed harshnesses that subsidized capital and aided the growth of industry while
imposing costs on workers. Others maintain that the evidence for subsidy
is either limited or nonexistent. They suggest judges were more evenhanded in distributing the costs of accidents and bad bargains among
competing economic groups. The legal historian of Populism is thus con
fronted with an absence of authority indicating how to make a detailed
comparison of Populist legal attitudes with non-Populist legal attitudes.9
8. See Michael Brodhead, Preserving Populist; Michael Brodhead, "Populism and the Law:
Some Notes on Stephen H. Allen," Kansas Quarterly 1 (Spring, 1969):76; R. Douglas Hurt,
"The Populist Judiciary: Election Reform and Contested Offices," Kansas History 4 (Summer,
1981): 130; Brian J. Moline, "The Populist Court: FrankJ. Doster and Stephen H. Allen," Journal
ofthe Kansas Bar Association (October, 1989):23.

9. Prominent histories of early negligence law reflecting fundamental disagreements over
how and why negligence law developed and the extent to which developing industry benefitted
from the path the law took are Charles O. Gregory, "Trepass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," Virginia Law Review 21 (April, 1951):359; Lawrence M. Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, "So?
cial Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents," Columbia Law Review 67 (January, 1967):50;
Lawrence M. Friedman and Thomas D. Russell, "More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation,

1901-1910," American Journal of Legal History 34 (July, 1990):295; Lawrence M. Friedman,
"Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late Nineteenth Century," American Bar Foundation
Research Journal 1987 (Spring-Summer, 1987):351; Gary T. Schwartz, "The Character of Early
American Tort Law," UCLA Law Review 36 (1989):641; Robert J. Kaczorowski, "The CommonLaw Background of Nineteenth Century Tort Law," Ohio State Law Journalr51 (1990):1127; Gary
T. Schwartz, "Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,"
Yale Law Journal 90 (July, 1981):1717; Robert L. Rabin, "The Historical Development of the
Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation," Georgia Law Review 15 (Summer, 1981):925. For a suggestion that Populist politics influenced negligence case results in one state, see Note, "Private Law
and Public Policy: Negligence Law and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina,"
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As a result this study is less an inquiry into the doctrinal specifics of
Populist law, and how that law might differ from non-Populist decisions,
than it is an attempt to discern the relationship between the Populist legis?
lative program and a select group of appellate opinions. Doctrinal develop?
ment necessarily received considerable attention, but the emphasis was
on developing a form of analysis that would test the validity of conflicting
schools of Populist historiography.10 Simply stated, if historians Hahn and

Goodwyn are correct, the fundamental radicalness of Populism should
have impelled efforts to formulate or find law that would punish and de-

stroy corporations. Populist judges should have been more eager to use
law as a device to improve the condition of Populism's producer constituency and to harm its corporate opponents. On the other hand, less revolu?
tionary decision making, with a general respect for the prerogatives of
private property and the corporate form, might lend credence to the writings of Bruce Palmer and Norman Pollack. Such holdings would suggest
that the Populist reform program was not a general assault on corporate
capitalism, but instead was offered in the context of a general acceptance
of a system of private ownership, market-based exchange, corporate activ?
ity, and predictable legal process.
The rather esoteric nature of legal learning indicates that inquiry into
fundamental Populist legal thought must start with Populists who were
most knowledgeable about existing rules. Such persons were more likely
to confront fully the relationship between the law and their reform beliefs.

Similarly, one should consider the actions and thoughts of Populists who

had the greatest opportunity and freedom to write about and shape a
state's law.

With these considerations in mind there can be no better source than the

North Carolina Law Review 66 (January, 1988):421. Two prominent works offering contrasting
views about the social winners and losers in nineteenth-century contract law and contract law's
relation to modern capitalism are Morton J. Horwitz, "The Historical Foundations of Modern

Contract Law," Harvard Law Review 87 (March, 1974):917; A.W.B. Simpson, "The Horwitz
Thesis and the History of Contracts," University of Chicago Law Review 46 (Spring, 1979):533.
10. This study is therefore analogous to the work of those historians who have attempted to
gauge the movement by analyzing Populist legislative behavior. See, for example, William F.
Holmes, "The Georgia Alliance Legislature," Georgia Historical Quarterly 68 (Winter, 1984):479;
O. Gene Clanton, " 'Hayseed Socialism' on the Hill: Congressional Populism, 1891-1895," West?
ern Historical Quarterly 15 (April, 1984): 139; Allen W. Trelease, "The Fusion Legislatures of 1895
and 1897: A Roll-Call Analysis ofthe North Carolina House of Representatives," North Carolina
Historical Review 57 (Summer, 1980):280; Peter H. Argersinger, "Ideology and Behavior: Legis?

lative Politics and Western Populism," Agricultural History 58 (January, 1984):43; Peter H.
Argersinger, "Populists in Power: Public Policy and Legislative Behavior," Journal of Interdisci?
plinary History 18 (Summer, 1987):81.
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Populists who served on the supreme court of Kansas. To be sure, Popul
or near Populists were elected to courts in several states. But only in Ka

sas, in 1897-1898, did the partyobtaina majorityona high court. In fact,
Kansas Supreme Court of those years was potentially the most radical
appellate court in American history. The men who made up its Populist
majority were Stephen Allen and Frank Doster. The third member of the
court was William Johnston, a Republican. In order to determine Populist
legal attitudes, it is most important to analyze how these judges ruled in
cases involving corporations. As a result, all opinions of Doster and Allen
that related to disputes involving incorporated associations, partnerships,
or other organized forms of business in 1897 were evaluated. The year 1897
was chosen because Populism was still a potent political force and because
the Populist majority on the court was new and presumably eager to rule.
During 1898 both national and Kansas Populism suffered fatal setbacks;
Allen was defeated for reelection and spent part ofthe year as a lame duck.
Moreover, by 1898 potential litigants had an opportunity to decide if they
wished to appear before a Populist court. As a result, the 1897 cases should
have presented the purest form of Populist jurisprudence.11
Allen and Doster achieved seats on the supreme court as a result of the
tremendous groundswell for Kansas Populism. Beginning in the late 1880s,
drought, the collapse of grain prices, the influence ofthe Farmers' Alliance,
and the unresponsiveness of Republicans to rural problems produced the

earliest and strongest local organization in the nation. The substance of
Kansas Populism is traced to the preachings ofthe Farmers' Alliance. The
party's first platform, in 1890, repeated earlier Alliance demands for abolition of national banks, free silver, paper money, and government ownership of railroads and telegraphs. In the campaign that followed the
Populists won control of the legislature. Two years later, after forging an
agreement with Democrats, the party elected the governor, a host of state
officials, and five Congressmen. Among the chosen in 1892 was Stephen
Allen, who won a six-year term on the state supreme court. Although the
party refused to make common cause with Democrats in 1894, and suffered
serious losses, cooperation sentiment was once again dominant in 1896.
Populists and Democrats won a substantial victory, taking all of the impor?
tant state offices, including the governorship, the legislature, and six seats
11. The sad but true fact is that the relatively small number of decisions rendered in Kansas
in 1897 are and will remain the purest grain from the Populist legal mill. Although I systematically reviewed the decisions of Doster and Allen for several years before and after 1897, the
circumstances of Kansas Populism and the non-Populist character of the Kansas court intro?
duced complexities into the context of decision-making that could have diluted expressions of
Populism. Populist judicial thought, if it was ever manifested, would have appeared in 1897.
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in Congress. A principal beneficiary ofthe 1896 triumph was Frank Doster,
who was elected chief justice ofthe supreme court.12
Stephen Allen's ascent to the bench was an archetypal story of western
success. Born in 1847, he grew up in modest circumstances in upstate New
York. Allen's family conditions were such that he worked odd jobs during

his teens and was deprived of an extensive formal education. In the late
1860s, however, he managed to study law in the office of a local practitioner

and gained admission to the bar. Allen then headed West. After a brief
period in Missouri he settled in Pleasanton, Kansas, a small town about 70
miles south of Kansas City. There he developed a winning practice, entered

local politics, and served two terms as the Democratic county attorney.
Allen's Populist education had begun by 1890, when he was elected district

court judge as a Democrat with Populist endorsement. His subsequent
elevation to the supreme court also reflected the delicate balance of inter-

ests in Democratic-Populist cooperation politics. At the Populists' June
1892, state nominating convention, he defeated Democrat John Martin, but
Allen himself was only a recent convert from Democracy.13

Stephen Allen was a sincere advocate of Populist principles who aired
his reform ideas during his years on the bench. In 1897 he endorsed such

eminently Populist proposals as a graduated income tax and government
ownership of railroads. After his court years, between 1899 and his death
in 1921, the former justice engaged in wide-ranging discussions of politi?

cal and legal issues. Allen still supported government ownership of rail?
roads, an income tax, low tariffs, a flexible, irredeemable national cur-

rency, and a law allowing the federal incorporation of private companies.
He also published articles on administrative law, civil procedure, criminal

law, and law and ethics. A devoted Wilson Progressive who favored the
League of Nations, Allen wrote two large volumes on comparative and
international law.14

The substance of Allen's legal reform was a broad-based challenge to
the status quo. He criticized the excessive use of injunctions against strik-

ing labor organizations. He denounced the complexity of civil pleading
rules. He advocated more compassion in the criminal law. Rehabilitation,
12. The literature of Kansas Populism is large and ever expanding. See especially Walter
T.K. Nugent, The Tolerant Populists: Kansas Populism and Nativism (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1963); Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Allen Peffer and the
People's Party (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974); 0. Gene Clanton, Kansas Popu?
lism: Ideas and Men (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976); ScottG. McNall, TheRoadto
Rebellion: Class Formation and Kansas Populism, 1865-1900 (Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1988); 0. Gene Clanton, Populism: The Humane Preference in America, 18901900 {Boston: Twayne, 1991).
13. Brodhead, "Stephen H. Allen," 77; Moline, "The Populist Court," 24-25.
14. Brodhead, "Stephen H. Allen," 81-84.
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not punishment, was desirable, and the death penalty was wrong. More
over, the law needed to seek out and condemn new classes of wrongdoers. "Reckless automobile drivers," irresponsible "Captains of Indus?
try," and the dishonest merchant threatened the well-being of society as
much as the more traditional burglar or murderer. The former judge also
had much to say about judicial reform. He thought voters ought to be able

to "recall" erroneous decisions, and, more generally, that less judges
should be "recruited from the law departments of the railroad compa?
nies." Underlying these proposals was the broad assumption that modern
government should undertake new responsibilities.15
The relationship between these views and Allen's judicial decisions
was suggested in roughly 30 business-related opinions in 1897. Although
the decisions naturally involved several categories of legal issues, for the
purposes of this analysis the dominant concern was used to classify each
dispute. The cases fell into four common law dominated areas: negligently inflicted personal injury or property damage, intentional wrongdoing, ownership of real property, and a wide variety of disagreements over
the enforceability of contracts.

Perhaps no area presented a greater opportunity to reshape the law in a
Populist direction than liability for injuries caused by negligent acts. Mod?

ern negligence rules were almost entirely court-created, and were only
about as old as Kansas itself. More important from a political perspective,

defendants in Kansas negligence cases were overwhelmingly railroads,
one of the great objects of Populist reform. Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
were individuals, passengers injured en route, pedestrians run over at

crossings, or railroad workers mangled or killed on the job. And Kansas
Populists certainly believed that the monopolistic lines should provide
safe service or employment; increased railroad safety was endorsed expressly by their party.16

From a judicial perspective there was much room for maneuver. Rules
relating to the existence of "negligence" were vague, turning on whether a
defendant had acted without "duecare." Whether a plaintiff was "contributorily negligent," thus barring recovery even when the defendant was at
fault, further complicated attempts to devise mechanical rules of applica?
tion.17 To be sure, by 1897 there were hundreds of railroad-related personal
injury decisions in Kansas and other jurisdictions that sought to identify the
15. Brodhead, "Stephen H. Allen," 81-84; Moline, "The Populist Court," 28.
16. Clanton, Kansas Populism, 61.
17. Negligence was defined broadly as "the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill."
Contributory negligence, similarly, occurred when the person injured by another's negligence
"contributed to the injury by his want of ordinary care." Christopher Stuart Patterson, Railway
Accident Law (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1886), 7, 45.
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respective duties of railroads, employees, and pedestrians crossing rail-

road tracks. Negligence law was not boundless. Nonetheless, changing
technology, varying sympathies of judges and juries toward railroads and
other industries, as well as the inherent impossibility of formulating absolute rules of "due care" for every conceivable form of accident produced
uncertainty and contradiction in rules and in application.18

Allen's negligence decisions showed a greater concern for safety than
for railroad company profits. All seven of his negligence cases involved
railroads as defendants, and five went against the lines. More important,

favorable results were obtained by recognizing that railroads had extensive duties to protect the safety of employees and pedestrians and by
giving wide authority to notoriously proplaintiff juries as fact finders. A
particularly illustrative case was Bradshaw v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad Company, which involved an injury to an employee engaged in uncoupling moving cars. The principal issue was the legal effect
of the defect in the couplers that caused the injury. The plaintiff testified
that he was unaware of the defect, but the company introduced evidence
that it had existed for more than a month before the accident. The estab?

lished rule was that an employer would not be liable if the employee
continued to work with knowledge of such a defect. Resolving the factual
contradiction against the plaintiff, the trial court had dismissed the case
by finding that because the defect was preexisting, the plaintiff had been
contributorily negligent. Allen reversed, without citing precedent, holding

that there was enough of a factual dispute that only a jury could make
such a determination.19

Allen's decisions indicated railroads had other specific duties. He
wrote, for example, that an injured bridge builder had "a right to rely on
the foreman and the men working under him to construct a safe support
before ordering him to go upon it." In another case he stated it was "unreasonable for [the railroad] to keep its trains standing across all the streets of
a town for so long a time and deny the public any opportunity to cross."
Such practices had led to the crushing death of a thirteen-year-old boy.
Similarly, an urban railway was castigated for the death of a nine-year-old
18. Contemporary attempts to describe the law that were helpful to this study included
Patterson, Railway Accident Law; Thomas G. Shearman and Amasa A. Redfield, A Treatise on
the Law of Negligence (New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 5th ed., 1898) (Tellingly, the preface
noted disagreement among courts and indicated that judges maintained a bias in favor of
corporations by denying liability.); Thomas M. Cooley,>4 Treatise on the Law of Torts, (Chicago:
Callahan and Co., 2nd 1888); and William B. Hale, Hand-Book on the Law of Torts (St. Paul:

West Publishing Co., 1896). Lawrence Friedman has remarked that such treatise writers, who
were trying to make sense of complex and rapidly evolving doctrine, admitted that in 1900 the
law of industrial accidents was "wildly nonuniform, full of 'unpardonable differences and distinctions'." Friedman, History of American Law, 484.
19. Bradshaw v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co., 58 Kansas 618 (1897).
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on his way home from school: "It would be difficult to conceive a more
reckless act than that of driving a street car at the rate of twelve miles an
hour into a swarm of school children just as they are leaving school." The
legal reasoning underlying these decisions was not a radical departure
from existing rules about railroad obligations to employees or to persons
crossing tracks. Allen's decisions harmonized with general principles of
late-nineteenth century negligence law. Nonetheless, his opinions clearly
emphasized deference to juries and rejected inordinate attachment to procedural or damages rules that would work in favor of railroads. Of particular significance was Allen's tendency to focus on supposedly unique facts,
and to decide the cases with few, if any, citations to previous authority,
particularly from states other than Kansas.20
Still, and congruent with Allen's faithfulness to precedent, there were
limitsto his willingnessto impose liability. \x\Atchison, Topeka, and Santa
Fe Railroad Company v. Whitbeck, he reversed a judgment for a nonem
ployee plaintiff on the ground that instructions given by the trial judge to
the jury were erroneous:
[The instructions] base liability on the maintenance by the Company of
dangerous conditions in its yard, and its failure to protect the plaintiff

therefrom. This is a novel theory of the law. The tracks and yards of
railroad companies, over and through which cars are propelled, are, of
necessity, places of danger; and the companies are not chargeable with
any guilt or wrong whatever merely because a railroad yard is danger?
ous, for danger is necessarily incident to railroad service, as now devel?
oped and understood. To impose liability on the Company, something

further must be shown. It must appear that it has done what it ought not
to have done, or has neglected to do what it ought to have done, and has
thereby unnecessarily increased the danger and caused injury to plain?
tiff. This idea is entirely excluded from the instructions asked and given.

Allen denounced the trial court's suggestions that "the Company was
bound to guarantee the public safety while engaged about the stockyards" adjacent to the rails. He also attacked the notion that contributory
negligence, if found, would bar the claim, because the company's wrongdoing was so egregious. Allen's opinion represented a direct assault on
the trial court's attempt to stray from existing law and impose an absolute
duty on railroads. In sum, Allen's negligence opinions indicate that al?
though he believed railroads and other businesses had extensive public

20. Kelly v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 58 Kansas 161 (1897); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.
Co. v. Cross, 58 Kansas 425, 427 (1897); Consofidated City & Che/sea ParkRy. Co. v. Car/son, 58
Kansas 62, 64(1897).
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duties, he also thought this area of law should not be used to satisfy
general grievances against corporations.21
The nature of Allen's reform jurisprudence was restated in slightly differ?
ent form in two opinions regarding intentional, as opposed to negligent, civil

wrongs. Wichita and Western Railway Company v. Quinn was prompted
when one W.J. Quinn, angered by the failure of a railroad to pay him for land

condemned for a right of way, proceeded to take a rail out of track adjacent
to his land. He was arrested after complaint by the railroad. Because of the
unpaid debt, Quinn sued the railroad for malicious prosecution, and a sympathetic jury awarded him $2,600. Under existing law liability hinged on the
existence of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff, a judgment exonerating the plaintiff from criminal wrongdoing, lack of probable cause for the
criminal prosecution, and maliciousness or ulterior motive by the party instigating the criminal action.22 Allen reversed the jury's finding, holding that a

Kansas statute making it a crime to destroy tracks provided at least probable
cause for the arrest. The justice was entirely unmoved by the debt claim,

concluding that it could not form the basis for damages even if Quinn's
"good faith" might prevent his criminal conviction.23

Even more telling was Drumm v. Cessnum, in which a jury awarded the
plaintiff the enormous sum of $8,000, also for malicious prosecution. The
plaintiff had been arrested and charged with taking money from the defen?
dant firm, perhaps a lender, by false pretenses. Once again, Allen reversed

the verdict. He noted evidence that "the jury was prejudiced against the
defendants, or their business," and suggested that this had distorted the
result. In sending the case back for a new trial he wanted the jury to render
a decision based only on legally relevant facts, and not on the status or
reputation of the defendant. Like the negligence opinions, Allen's inten?

tional wrong decisions suggest an assumption that law should not be
used to express militant anti-corporatism.24
Another area of business litigation arose out of statutory rights to real
property. Allen's ordinary, if mildly reformist, attitudes on this subject
were displayed in two cases concerned with ownership and condemnation
of real property. The first involved a dispute between the Union Terminal
Railroad Company and a soap manufacturer over the amount of compensation to be paid by the railroad in a condemnation proceeding. It raised
the question of whether evidence of the possible use of the condemned
tract for a future addition to the soap factory was admissible. Without
citing precedent, Allen adopted an expansive view of what testimony
21. Atchison, Topeka 8t Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Whitbeck, 57 Kansas 729, 733-34 (1897).
22. Cooley, Law of Torts, 208.
23. Wichita 8i Western Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 57 Kansas 737, 743 (1897).
24. Drumm v. Cessnum, 58 Kansas 331 (1897).

39 Populism

could be heard. Discussions of the planned addition did not necessarily
suggest wholly speculative profits, he thought, but helped identify th
land's present market value. Given that railroads were a principal private
holder and user of eminent domain, and that Populists believed railroads
had already acquired too much land through public grants as well as
eminent domain, the decision should have pleased Allen's party.25
Southern Kansas Railway Company y. Showalter addressed the ownership of a vacated street in the tiny town of Wellington. The railroad, which
owned lots on the north side ofthe street, claimed the property based on a
state law that provided that owners of adjacent property to vacated land
could claim title. Showalter, on the other hand, argued that according to the
same law, as owner of lots on the south side of the street, she was entitled to

half the vacated street. Allen wrote an opinion that decided the case against
the railroad. It did not matter that Showalter's property was not originally in

the town, and that the creation of the street probably prevented the railroad

from obtaining the land through eminent domain in the first place. Allen,
without citing precedent, concluded simply that, according to the language
of the statute, because the land had not actually been taken from the rail?
road, it should be divided equally among abutting landowners.26
Despite the importance of personal injury and property disputes, the
largest number of Allen's opinions involving businesses related to con?
tract rights. Fittingly, while negligence and property questions often in?
volved railroads, contract litigation frequently asked the court to address
the other primary economic relationship that concerned Populists: the
rights of creditors and debtors, particularly real property mortgagors and
mortgagees. Contract law in the 1890s was dominated by judge-made
rules. There were relatively few statutory interferences with contract law,

including protections for consumers or employees. The basic legal issues
in contract cases were whether there was a binding agreement, and, if so,
what rights or obligations were thereby conferred upon the parties.27
Contract cases naturally involved quite different factual circumstances.
There were disputes over employment terms, mortgages on real and per?
sonal property, cash debts, and what competing creditor could seize the
25. Union Terminal R.R. Co. v. Peet Brothers Manufacturing Co., 58 Kansas 197 (1897). The
Kansas eminent domain statute appeared in General Statutes of Kansas, 1897 (Topeka: W.C.
Webb, 1897), c. 68.

26. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Showa/ter, 57 Kansas 681 (1897). The statutory provision is in
General Statutes of Kansas, 1897, s. 811.

27. Contemporary attempts to expound contract rules that were useful to this study included Francis Wharton, A Commentary on the Law of Contracts (Philadelphia: Kay & Brother,
1882); Theophilus Parsons [Samuel Williston, ed.], The Law of Contracts (Boston: Little, Brown
&Co., 1893); and William L. Clark, Hand-Book ofthe Law of Contracts (St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1894).
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meager assets of a bankrupt. Each of these conflicts could and did pose a
number of legal issues for the court, some of which involved legal principles only partly incorporated within the general law of contract. For pur-

poses of this analysis, the contract cases were arranged into three categories: disputes over "pure" debts for cash or real property, including
mortgages, disputes over business arrangements such as employment,
insurance, and leases, or the sale of personal property, and disputes
among creditors for the property of a mutual debtor. These groupings do
not reflect traditional categories of legal analysis. Rules purporting to govern secured debts for real property, for example, were quite distinct from
those which addressed other kinds of debts. Instead, it was hoped that

something could be learned about Populism by systematically grouping
and considering the treatment of certain classes of parties.
The most likely area of Populist influence should have been in cases
concerned with contests over debts for cash or for money loaned to pur?
chase real property. After all, much party spleen was directed at the greed

of lending banks and land companies. The precursor to the party, the
Farmers' Alliance, diligently sought to alter existing credit relationships,
especially those related to the mortgage. Moreover, Allen had consider?
able opportunity to push the law in a Populist direction. Of the five cases of
this kind assigned to him, all included either a bank or an investment
company against an individual or individuals.
Significantly, however, Allen failed to create new legal barriers for this
variety of creditors. A good example was Teats v. Bank of Harrington, in
which the bank received a cash judgment against Teats. When Teats refused to comply with an order to appear in court and provide answers as

to why the judgment had not been satisfied, the presiding judge had her
arrested in another county. After the arrest an examination of the debtor's
property was made and an order to use the property in settlement of the
debt issued. Teats appealed on the ground that the arrest was illegal and
thus the subsequent judgment was invalid. Allen held for the bank, stating
that it did not matter if the arrest was invalid, because the trial court had

jurisdiction over the debt regardless of where Teats resided. Certainly one
legal effect of the holding was not pathbreaking; Kansas trial judges obviously had broad powers to enforce orders. Nonetheless, Allen's opinion
could hardly give solace to Populist debtors, because it meant their person
might be forcibly detained as long as a court had authority to determine
the fate of their property.28
28. Teats v. Bank of Herrington, 58 Kansas 721 (1897). On judges' contempt powers, see
General Statutes of Kansas, c. 85, s. 2 (1897).
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Even more revealing was Thomas v. Owen, which involved a fore-

closed piece of land in Emporia. The mortgagee, or the entity that loan

money for the property, was a Wisconsin insurance company, an

achieved the foreclosure and subsequent sale in federal court. Owen, th

displaced mortgagor, claimed that he had never received a summons
relative to the federal case, thus making the sale illegal. A Kansas jury
agreed and awarded him $3,600. However, relying on earlier Kansas precedent and cases from Indiana, Alabama, and Pennsylvania, Allen reversed,
finding that the federal magistrate's statement that a summons had been
served was conclusive as a matter of law. There could not be a later

inquiry into whether the federal court had jurisdiction. Once again,

ruling was in harmony with persuasive non-Populist precedent. The deci

sion certainly should have erased conservative fears that judgments

Republican-dominated federal courts, even when the rights of an out-of
state lender were asserted, would be nullified by Populists.29
Yet the best example of Allen's solicitude for owners' and creditors'

legal rights is Marysville Investment Company v. Holle. It was a complicated dispute, involving claims between settlers and the company over
title to land in Marshall County. The principal question was whether the
settlers' presence on the land over many years prevented the company
from claiming title, despite the fact that it appeared the company possessed superior written contract rights. A jury, acting on instructions from
the trial judge, found that the land belonged to the settlers. Allen, how?

ever, reversed and remanded for a new trial. He thought the evidence
demonstrated that legal title passed from the government through several
written transfers to the company. This result was necessary even though
"the plaintiff corporation appears somewhat in the attitude of a speculator
in stale titles." Moreover,
We are well aware that the law relating to title to land falls far short of

effecting an equal, or seemingly equitable, distribution of the face of
the earth among the people. Arbitrary rules, often exceedingly harsh,
fix the rights of parties. Courts are not at liberty to take from one and
give to another whom they deem more worthy, unless the established

rules of law sustain his right. In the eye of the law, the need of one
weights nothing against the strict right of another, who may have absolutely no apparent use for the property in controversy. It is better that
we should adhere to and enforce the law as we find it than be guilty of
any disregard of its principles for the purpose of attaining what, to us as
individuals, may appear better justice.
29. Thomas v. Owen, 58 Kansas 313 (1897).

42 agricultural history

Allen's statement suggests a conservative attachment to existing law. In

short, Justice depended on fealty to clearly stated rules, even when the
immediate result might be to injure a Populist constituent.30
Allen's record in the employment, insurance, and lease disputes was
largely conventional, although, much like in the negligence cases, he
tended to obtain results against corporations. In Cunningham v. Colonial
and United States Mortgage Company, the trial court had summarily
found on the company's motion that a loan collector employee owed the
company several thousand dollars. When the amount was not paid, the
Court had the employee thrown in jail. Allen disagreed, without citing
precedent, finding that there were disputed issues of fact and that under
the circumstances the jailing of the employee for failure to pay the debt
was contrary to law. Allen also wrote an opinion denying claims by a fire
insurance company that a foreclosure on insured real property terminated
its contractual obligation. He believed the insurer could not avoid liability
simply because the beneficiary of the policy was the mortgagee. He later
authored an opinion that held that state courts had extensive jurisdiction
to determine the contract obligations of out-of-state corporations even
when their contracts were not entered into in Kansas and when the pres?
ence of the company there was limited to an insurance sales agency.31 The
significance of these decisions is not that they were expressions of a new
Populist law; they were not. For example, it was accepted that ambiguities
in insurance contracts were to be construed in favor ofthe insured. None-

theless, the results clearly protected persons from inequitable avoidance
of contract obligations by corporations.
A more persuasive indication that Allen had a special aversion to equitably unjust refusals to perform appeared in two cases involving land leased
from Indians. In Kansas and New Mexico Land and Cattle Company v.
Thompson he wrote an opinion that stated that if an individual leased
Indian land with consent, the individual could agree to let others use the
land as pasture and then collect from the users the value of the grazing.

The company had argued that a federal law prohibited the Indians from
leasing the land, thus making any subsequent contract unenforceable.
Although conceding the illegality of the original lease, Allen emphasized
the inequity of allowing the cattlemen to use the land and then avoid

30. Marysville Investment Co. v. Holle, 58 Kansas 773 (1897).
31. Cunningham v. Colonial and United States Mortgage Co., Ltd., 57 Kansas 678 (1897);
Lancashire Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 58 Kansas 339 (1897); German Insurance Co. v. First

National Bank of Boonville, New York, 58 Kansas 86 (1897). On the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud, see Kansas Bill of Rights, s. 16.
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payment. More revealing, however, was that this case led to a subsequen

dispute between the Indians and the lessee, the victor in the earlier
preme court opinion. The winner now refused to pay the Indians on
ground that the lease was invalid. On this point, however, Doster an

Johnston held that the Indians had no rights. They distinguished the e
lier case on the theory that rights were based on an agreement between
the lessee and a third party that was not prohibited by law. In contrast,
agreement between the Indians and the lessee was barred by statute and

was thus unenforceable. Allen dissented. He thought Congress wante
protect, not punish, Indians, and that the Court's ruling had the effect
"turning legislation intended as a shield for the weak and unsuspect
into a sword in the hand of their enemies." As in the earlier decision, he

wanted the court to utilize equity to prevent the unjust enrichment of a
party that had benefitted from the use of the Indians' land.32
The third and final type of contract matters Allen faced were disputes
among creditors. Generally, they arose when a debtor slid into insolvency
and only limited assets remained. The creditors' lawsuit was a scramble
over what was left. The disputes might take place in the context of Kansas'
statute that prohibited transfers from debtors in order to defraud credi?

tors.33 Questions as to whether debtors were hiding assets and as to the
effectiveness of liens and attachments were also quite common. Because
these legal battles tended to become intercorporate affairs, they failed to
present some of the stark class confrontations of other contract cases.
Accordingly, they were analyzed to determine Allen's general attitudes
toward corporations and creditors.
The outstanding policy theme was not leniency toward debtors. In fact,
Allen consistently denounced attempts to escape just debts, particularly
by fraudulent transfers. In Watson v. Holden, creditors of a fallen bank
argued that the bank, in its waning days, had created paper companies to

hide ownership of mortgages on real property. Although deciding the
dispute on other grounds, Allen agreed there was a scheme to conceal:
[t]hese companies were unsubstantial, if not mythical entities ... [t]hey
had no property except such as the bank gave them.... Courts do not
hesitate to break through and brush away such figments, and treat that
as fraudulent which deceives the creditors and conceals from them the

true situation of the debtor's property.34
32. Kansas & New Mexico Land and Cattle Co. v. Thompson, 57 Kansas 792 (1897); Mayes
v. Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association, 58 Kansas 712, 720 (1897) (Allen, J., dissenting).
33. General Statutes of Kansas, 1897, c. 111.

34. Watson v. Holden, 58 Kansas 657, 664 (1897).
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In another appeal, Allen chastised a merchant for hiding the assets of his
declining business. His incorporation of a separate company was "a paper
scheme devised in his own interest," and the trial court correctly nullified
the "elaborate fabrications of charters, by-laws, and paper transfers."35
Similarly, he reversed a jury verdict for a debtor because of erroneous
anticreditor instructions. He thought there had been a fraudulent attempt
to avoid the grasps of an encircling hardware supplier when the merchant
transferred his stock to his brother.36

Moreover, Allen was not interested in limiting remedies available to
corporate creditors. In a claim by a corporation holding a mortgage on
cattle, he held, despite an unusual arrangement with a third party regarding the ownership of such mortgages, that the corporation had priority
over an individual claiming the same property.37 The point was made even
more clearly by the only case in this study which generated a dissent from
Johnston, the Republican justice. Standard fmplement Company v. Lansing Wagon Works was a fight among three corporate creditors for the
assets of a farm implement dealer debtor. The extent of difference be?
tween Johnston and the Populist was that Allen's opinion was implicitly
more hostile to lienholders seeking to overturn an attachment order in
favor of an earlier creditor. Johnston wanted to give subsequent creditors
a better opportunity to attack the previous judgment. The narrowness of
the legal dispute, which concerned only the "scope of inquiry" in determining whether the prior attachment could be overturned, indicated that there
was no fundamental difference among the justices regarding the general
rights of corporations as creditors. In sum, Allen's opinions were neither
anticorporate nor anticreditor.38
Kansas' other justice, Frank Doster, was among the nation's most prominent Populists. Born in what is now West Virginia in 1847, his western
experience began quite early, as he moved to Indiana and then to lllinois
while still a boy. It is unlikely that his family possessed significant wealth.
Doster's first great adventure came when he joined an Indiana calvary
group in 1864, and, for the remainder ofthe Civil War, served inTennessee
and Mississippi. After Appomattox, his unit was sent to the Kansas fron?
tier, where it performed duties along the Santa Fe Trail. Doster subse?
quently returned to Indiana and lllinois for formal education. He attended
various schools in the mid- and late 1860s, including Indiana University,
35. Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 58 Kansas 43, 50-51 (1897).
36. Morse v. Ryland, 58 Kansas 250 (1897).
37. Ketcham v. Barse Live Stock Commission Co., 57 Kansas 771 (1897). Doster only decided one case of this variety, McDowell v. Gibson, 58 Kansas 607 (1897), which also failed to
demonstrate any overriding bias against creditors. It merely encouraged the finality of original
judgments against attacks from subsequent claiming creditors.
38. Standard Implement Company v. Lansing Wagon Works, 58 Kansas 125 (1897).
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lllinois College, and the Benton Law Institute. Doster had been impr

by the openness of the Kansas plains, still largely unsettled, while in th
Army. In 1871 the newly licensed lawyer decided to return and settle i
Marion, a small town in central Kansas.39
Over the next 60 years Doster achieved a successful law practice and
considerable political prominence. Involved at first in Republican politics,
he made a successful run for the state legislature in 1871. The subsequent
rise of reform third parties dramatically altered his future. In 1878 he aban-

doned the Republicans in favor of the new Greenback Party. By 1890 he
was among the early converts to Populism. Throughout the early 1890s
Doster was a devoted party advocate, providing legal representation to
Populists in contested elections, making speeches, and participating in
party leadership. Of course, such activities were curtailed after his elevation to the supreme court, and by the time his term expired in 1903 Popu?
lism had faded from the landscape. For the remainder of his life, with the
exception of a failed bid for the United States Senate in 1914, he conducted a Topeka law practice, published essays, and made speeches for
reform causes.40

Doster's active political engagement between 1890 and 1896 produced

many revealing statements of faith. In 1891 he created a furor among
Kansas Republicans by stating that "the rights of a user of a thing were
paramount to the rights of its owner." This revolutionary concept of prop?
erty derived from Doster's reading of contemporary reform thinkers, in-

cluding Henry George and Edward Bellamy. Doster also questioned the
ability of laissez-faire to achieve social justice. Society was too interdependent, power too easily concentrated, for fairness to emerge under the old
economic dogma. Instead, he supported government action to preventthe

negative effects of personal greed and to mitigate inherent conflict be?
tween capital and labor. Populist remedies of more currency and govern?
ment ownership of railroads could help bring about a desired "equality of
human brotherhood."

These ideas naturally affected his attitude toward the law. He disliked
the reigning judicial activism of the federal Supreme Court, particula
the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to shield private property. He con
sidered the legislature, and not courts, as the superior law maker. Indeed
he repudiated altogether the ability of courts to review statutes for con
tutionality. Yet Doster did not reject existing private law. Believing rece
judicial tendencies had merely distorted its original function, he though
39. Doster's public career has received considerable attention. See especially Brodhead,
Persevering Populist; Moline, "The Populist Court"; Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 13255; Clanton, Kansas Populism, 106-10; Pollack, The Just Polity, 136-45.
40. See generally Brodhead, Persevering Populist.
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that law, including the common law, was a necessary means of achieving

justice. His support for tradition and change were merged in an 1896
campaign promise to "diligently search the books and find some law
through which the interests of the common people will be served."41
In 1897 Doster wrote about 30 business-related opinions. Not surprisingly, headdressed issues similarto those considered by Allen. Negligence
claims against railroads and disputes over contractual rights predominated. Intentional wrongs and controversies relating to the organization of
corporations received more limited attention. However, as chief justice,
Doster was able to choose which justice would author an opinion. He used
this prerogative to give himself some especially important cases. His con?
trol even extended to writing for the majority on points with which he
personally disagreed.
Negligently caused personal injury was the second most frequent subject of his opinions. Doster authored eight such decisions, and all except
two involved railroads as defendants. Generally, his legal conclusions
placed high burdens on the lines. Doster, in fact, was even more willing than
Allen to express openly the policy goal of public safety. His sentiments appeared most plainly in discussions of a few crucial legal principles. One par?
ticularly persistent device was deference to proplaintiff juries. In Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Swarts, despite overwhelming
evidence in favor of the company's version of the facts, the chief justice
sided with the plaintiff and the discretion of the jury. He expressly rejected
attempts to use different New York precedent to weaken this discretion.42
Doster also made calculated moves to reduce the possibility of a suc-

cessful defense of contributory negligence in the context of crossing accidents. Especially demonstrative was a case in which this early champion
of women's suffrage used prevailing prejudices against women to allow
recovery. When a defendant argued that the contributory negligence of a

carriage-driving husband should be imputed to the wife because she directed the trip which led to her injury, Doster disagreed, noting that it was
a "universal sense of mankind, [that] a privilege of management, a superiority of control, a right of mastery on such occasions is accorded to the
husband, which forbids the idea of coordinate authority, much less a supremacy of command, in the wife."43
The Chief Justice, moreover, placed specific duties of care on corporate
41. Brodhead, Persevering Populist, 56-112. Doster also said: "I know only one code of law
and that is the same one studied by other lawyers and I shall try to follow it as best I can." Such
assurances hardly placated anxious Republicans, who made his more radical statements the
focus ofthe Republican-Fusion contest of 1896. See Id. at 101-02.

42. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Swarts, 58 Kansas 235, 239 (1897).
43. Reading Township, Lyon County v. Telfer, 57 Kansas 798, 802 (1897).
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defendants. One such case involved injury to a minor trespasser. In Pric
v. Atchison Water Company an eleven-year-old boy fell into the company's reservoir and drowned. The trial court had dismissed the claim in

favor of the company, presumably because the defendant had built a
barbed wire fence around the water. Reversing, Doster stated that th
common law punished those who did not take "reasonable precautions"

to insure even trespassers' safety. Especially noteworthy was the manner
in which the Chief Justice curtly dismissed the company's argument that it

was absolved from any liability because it had erected a fence. He noted

the obvious fact that the fence did not work, and added that the company

knew persons had crawled over it in the past. Doster also thought tha
"boys can seldom be said to be negligent when they merely follow th

irresistible impulses of their own natures." Much of this was legaily signifi?

cant. The doctrine of "attractive nuisance," which creates liability for prop?
erty owners who maintain "alluring" conditions which lead to injury, espe?
cially to children, was then a subject of great contention. Doster's decision

established that Kansas, unlike many other states, would give an expan
sive reading to the rule.44
Doster's perspective on liability also surfaced in disagreements with his
fellow justices on the specific question of evidence of lack of due care. In

Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Tindall, Johnston

and Allen reversed a verdict in favor of an injured railroad employee. They

found that there was no evidence that the company was negtigent, and
held that the employee, at any rate, had been at fault. Although Doste

agreed that contributory negligence may have occurred, he thought knowl

edge of dangerous conditions could be imputed to the company: "A rail

road company is presumed to have knowledge of a defect in its machinery
or a dangerous condition of its track, existing under such circumstances as

to give it reasonable opportunity to learn of the same." Later, in dissenting

from two sections of the Swarts opinion, Doster again argued that ther
should be an assumption that a railroad knows of a continuing defect. In
short, Doster attempted to weaken the prevailing rule that an employe
was not liable for injuries when the defect was latent by imposing a presumption of employer knowledge.45

Even if he was a stickler for safety in railroad switching yards, Atchison,

44. Price v. Atchison Water Company, 58 Kansas 551, 554, 557 (1897). On the development
of the attractive nuisance doctrine, see Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James Jr., and Oscar S. Gray
The Law of Torts (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 2d ed., 1986), Vol. 5, 159-88.
45. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Tinda/i, 57 Kansas 719, 726 (1897); Swarts, 58
Kansas at 241-42. Beyond demonstrating deference to juries and weakening the likelihood of
contributory negligence, Doster also displayed a tendency to nullify plaintiffs' pleading errors.
See Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mills, 57 Kansas 687 (1897) (woman wrongly sue
as administratrix of killed husband, not widow; she was allowed to maintain case).
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Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Willey established that Doster
did not favor abandonment of the fault standard. In this dispute George W.

Willey was hit by a locomotive while driving his wagon across tracks o
the open plains of central Kansas. Willey won a substantial jury verdict
but Doster reversed. To be sure, he thought the railroad's poor maintenance of a view-blocking high hedge adjacent to the accident scene was
negligence. On the other hand, he believed it could have been contributory
negligence that Willey did not stop to see if a train was approaching:
"Regard for one's own personal safety, and that of others to whom he may
stand in dangerous relations, requires that exercise of diligence and cau
tion; and the policy of the law should be to impose penalties upon the

negligent injurer, and likewiseto hold relief from the negligent sufferer."46

Most important, the decision indicated that Doster was willing to follow
the prevailing legal notion that plaintiffs had a specific duty to protec

themselves even when a railroad was negligent.
Doster's two non-negligence civil wrong cases also tend to suggest that
his decision-making did not repudiate established rules, even if they migh

impose liability on railroads. The first was a private nuisance action

brought by an abutting land owner for damages caused by the erosion of a
railroad drainage ditch. Doster thought precedent precluded liability fo
the otherwise lawful diversion or obstruction of surface water. Yet he

found for the plaintiff because the source of the flow, a railroad right of
way, was unnatural. Doster relied in part on the well-known English case
of Rylands v. Fletcher, which he described as supporting the principle th

one who brings something "likely to do mischief" onto his property

responsible for all damage regardless of fault if the "dangerous" material
escapes.47 Still, railroads were not responsible for all injury. In a maliciou

prosecution action Doster reversed a jury verdict against a railroad b
cause the corporation could only be liable for the actions of its agents
when the wrongful acts were "performed in the line of employment

such agent and in the execution of the authority conferred." The jury had
been willing to assess damages even though it believed the agent was not

acting on behalf of the company in directing a complaint against a pu
ported burglar. Doster apparently did not wish to expand the vicarious
liability of corporations.48
Neither negligence nor other civil wrongs, however, made up a major-

ity of Doster's business docket. Instead, most of his opinions addressed
46. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Willey, 57 Kansas 764, 770 (1897). For a discus?
sion of variations in the application of this, the Stop-Look-Listen Rule, see Harper et al., The Law
of Torts, Vol. 3, 570-72.

47. Reinhartv. Sutton, 58 Kansas 726, 731-32 (1897).

48. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Brown, 57 Kansas 786 (1897).
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contract rights. He evaluated agreements for mortgages, cash loans, sal
and insurance. Doster generally managed to excuse himself from the ki

of tedious contest among creditors suits that plagued Allen. As a res

the issues in his contract cases more frequently involved direct confron
tions between individuals and corporations, particularly banks, insuranc
companies, and railroads.
Doster's decisions in the land-debt area often benefitted Populist con
stituents, if not radically. He achieved favorable results most often by
giving beneficial readings to the state's Statute of Frauds, which required
contracts for the sale of land to be in writing, and to the constitutional
Homestead exemption, which allowed landowner-debtors to exempt up to

160 acres from a money judgment. In one Statute of Frauds case Doster
held that a letter to a third person, not the buyer, stating that a piece of
land had been sold, was sufficient to meet the writing requirement.49 Simi?
larly, he reversed the judgment of a trial court and held that Kansas law

bound a mortgage company to the terms of its written offer of sale.50
Doster's interpretation ofthe Homestead exemption is also suggestive. In
Peak v. Lenora State Bank, because the debtor Peak lived on a less valu-

able piece of his farm, and because the Homestead provision only protected property that contained the actual home place, Peak faced the prospect of losing his choice land. The case asked whether Peak could protect
the better land by moving onto it after judgment. Doster validated Peak's

actions by ruling generally against the creditor-bank. He reasoned that
"Homestead interests are subjects of special favor by the courts, and
claims of homestead exemptions are to be liberally viewed."51

Decisions involving cash and service exchanges produced equally sug?
gestive conclusions. The most important was a tendency to evaluate and
enforce corporate agreements based on the extent ofthe company's "pub?

lic" role. Of course, the law had long given special treatment to business
49. Millerv. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis R.R. Co., 58 Kansas 189 (1897). The statute
was located in General Statutes of Kansas, 1897, c. 112, s. 6.

50. Bog/e v. Jarvis, 58 Kansas 76 (1897). See also Miller v. Kansas City, Fort Scott & Mem?
phis R.R. Co., 58 Kansas 189 (1897) (contract was sufficient under Statute of Frauds even though
price paid was not written). Still, there were limits to Doster's lenient reading of real estate
contracts. In Carbondale Investment Co. v. Burdick, 58 Kansas 517 (1897), he reversed a jury
verdict against a real estate developer. Doster relied on established rules allowing that damages

awarded the injured purchasers had been based on unduly speculative evidence and that the
jury had been wrongly allowed to interpret the contracting parties' intent when the written
language of agreement was unambiguous.
51. Peaky. Lenora State Bank, 58 Kansas 485 (1897). The Homestead provision was located
in Article 15, s. 9 ofthe Kansas Constitution. It had long been generally recognized in American
law that such exemptions were to be given a broad reading. For this reason Doster's attitude
toward the Statute of Frauds may be more legally significant, as many courts viewed the writing
rule restrictively. See C. Dallas Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction (Chicago: Callahan &
Co., 3d ed. rev., 1974), vol. 3, ss. 69.06, 70.02.
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affected with a public interest, particularly carriers. Doster appeared espe?
cially interested in the distinction. In Solomon Salt Co. v. Barber, for exam?

ple, he ruled that a company could not avoid its shareholders' agreement
to purchase the stock of another shareholder in the company's name.
Such commitments were not outside its corporate authority. But Doster
then expressly questioned whether such internal agreements would be
enforceable for companies involved in "public service," such as "railway
and water companies."52
The "public service" idea may have had some effect in several cases.
Alexandria, Arcadia, and Fort Smith Railroad Company v. Johnson in?
volved a railroad's attempt to excuse itself from the obligations of a con?
tract. The railroad argued that certain promises were beyond its corporate
powers. However, citing decisions from Kansas and other states, Doster
reversed the trial court and bound the company to the agreement because
it would have been unjust to allow one party not to perform when the
other party had already met the terms of the bargain.53 A similar result
obtained when a railroad failed to live up to its agreement to provide an
individual with annual passes. One of the railroad's defenses was that the
federal Interstate Commerce Act prohibited railroads from giving passes.
Although Populists often argued that passes were used to corrupt politics,
Doster held that the company could not "shelter itself" behind the law,
because it had already exchanged the passes for land.54
Another analysis of a public service company's obligations was Mulvane
v. O'Brien. The case involved a rather sordid scheme by one Joab Mulvane,
the president of a water company, to sell the utility to new investors. He
reached an agreement with O'Brien, a shareholder, to transfer O'Brien's
shares to the buyers at par. In return, O'Brien agreed to let Mulvane keep
any selling amount above par. Actually, Mulvane already knew that he
could sell the shares for far above the par amount. Doster refused to enforce

the agreement between Mulvane and O'Brien on the corporate law ground
that Mulvane had only limited duties to shareholders. Instead, according to
Doster, liability for the wrong grew out ofthe fact that Mulvane was actually
the direct agent of O'Brien. The emphasis was on requiring ethical conduct
by corporate managers.55
Despite the radical potential ofthe "public service" idea, Doster drew a
traditional boundary as to what kinds of corporations might be considered
52. Soloman Salt Co. v. Barber, 58 Kansas 419, 423-24 (1897). For a nearly contemporary
view ofthe unique status of "public" corporations, see Bruce Wyman, The Special Law of Public
Service Corporations (New York: Baker, Voorhis, & Co., 1911), especially Vol. I, pp. 1-36.
53. Alexandria, Arcadia & Fort Smith R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 58 Kansas 175 (1897).

54. Curry v. Kansas 8/ Colorado Pacific Ry. Co., 58 Kansas 6, 18 (1897).
55. Mu/vane v. O'Brien, 58 Kansas 463 (1897).
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"public." He was thus uninterested in a redefinition of the obligations of
insurance companies. Insurers were not classed historically with carrier
and other public service corporations, although their contracts were subject
to special rules. One revealing insurance dispute involved the liability of a
fraternal organization.56 Doster's attitude toward such groups is important
After all, Populism had sprung from a fraternal organization, the Farmers
Alliance.57 Despite this, Doster failed to view the legal responsibilities
among members of "fraternal cooperative societies" apart from prevailing
legal concepts. It is, he thought, a "contract relation," and "in the effort to
ascertain the rights of a member against the [co-operative] upon the occasion of a loss by him, their positions and interests are antagonistic." The
case asked whether a member petitioning for disability benefits could bring
suitin court. Doster thought a mere "custom" thata party could not pursue
ordinary legal remedies was not valid, and held against the cooperative. As

a result, he suggested that the apparent inequity of denying the performance of a contract outweighed any damage to the cooperative structure.
The decision was in harmony with prevailing principles of insurance law.58
Any attempt to determine whether appellate decisions can illuminate

Populism faces considerable barriers. Given flexible legal rules and inevitable factual differences, there is a seemingly infinite number of nonquantifiable variables. There are also institutional complications, such as the

fact that the decisions, although authored by one individual, were intended to reflect the view of the entire court. The dilemma this poses is
evidenced by the failure of the Republican justice, Johnston, to disagree
more often. Even if Johnston was not a conservative, his lack of dissent

makes it impossible to designate areas of dramatic disagreement be?
tween him and his Populist brethren.59
Nonetheless, in 1897 two committed Populists signed their names to
56. Order of Select Friends v. Dey, 58 Kansas 283 (1897). Insurance law is analyzed in
Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., Commentaries on the Law of Insurance, 2 Vols. (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin&Co., 1895).

57. Even more important, according to Lawrence Goodwyn, the "cooperative crusade [of
the Alliance] provided the mass dynamics for the creation of the People's party." Lawrence
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976), 142.

58. Dey, 58 Kansas at 287, 292. Doster did not rule every insurance claim valid. For example,
he wrote an opinion in favor of one insurer because the policyholders had failed to file their claim
within the time limits ofthe Statute of Limitations, the very sort of "technical" defense one might
expect to have reduced validity for an anti-corporate Populist. CottrelN. Manlove, 58 Kansas 405
(1897). He also reversed a jury finding of fraud against an insurance company because the trial
judge had given the jury a too lax definition of what degree of proof was required to show fraud.

Kansas Mill Owners' and Manufacturers'Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Rammelsberg, 58 Kansas
531 (1897). On the prevailing view that contract governed relations between policyholders and
benevolent associations, see Beach, Law of Insurance, Vol. 1,111-50.

59. On Johnston's lack of conservative bias, see Brodhead, "Stephen H. Allen," 78.
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roughly 60 business-related opinions. Most important for the analyst,
there is enough discernable coherence, consistency, and direction in their
individual and collective efforts to warrant several conclusions. The clarity
and uniformity is most obvious in the negligence and intentional wrong
realm. There, the persistent circumstance of large, often interstate rail?
roads pitted against maimed individuals confronted Allen and Doster with

patently demonstrable social choices. Both men responded by using this
area of law to force railroads, and, to a limited extent, other businesses, to

increase public and employee safety. They did this by deferring to juries
and by increasing the legal duties of defendant corporations. Interestingly,

there was disagreement among the two Populists. Doster was more anxious than Allen to create rules ensuring liability, especially on the ground
that certain acts by railroads were negligence as a matter of law.
Equally revealing, however, neither judge was willing to challenge the

fault standard by imposing absolute liability for any harm, and neither
judge, even when imposing liability, took obviously radical stands outside
the general bounds of tort law. Their decisions reaffirmed the centrality of
fault and recognized that only plaintiffs free of fault could recover. This, of
course, left the burden and uncertainty of legal action on injured plaintiffs.
The expense, difficulty of proof, and slowness of process meant that, as a

practical matter, some wrongs would go without remedies. Even when
results favored plaintiffs, Doster and Allen at most simply modified exist-

ing law; they did not indicate that Populism offered a genuinely radical
alternative. The Populist version of negligence did not challenge the pre?
vailing dogma that only demonstrable corporate "fault" merited recovery.
Whether the contract decisions reflected a genuinely innovative Popu?

list position is even more doubtful. The difficulty of analysis is compounded by the fact that, unlike in negligence, the contract matters might
fail to array a poor individual against a mighty corporation. Worse, even
when an obvious Populist contest was presented, the corporation could
usually come to court with a promise from the individual to do something
that had not been done. At any rate, about the most that can be said of
Doster and Allen's contract decisions is that in their Court agreements
were enforced regardless of technical defenses. This sanctioned corpora?
tions that attempted to use superior legal staying power by denying con?
tract liability pending litigation. The two more consistent legal means of
obtaining this end were rejecting claims that corporations lacked power to

enter into agreements and openly condemning and punishing corporate
fraud. Yet the narrowness of this theme, as well as its grounding in tradi?
tional rules of equity and contract, is such that it indicates that there was
no aggressive Populist redefinition of contract rights, even for mortgagors
of real property.
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In fact, the general impression left by Populist contract decision

decided ordinariness. Allen and Doster always returned to the fundamen

tal principle that individuals are obligated to perform their conside

agreements. This view obtained even if the failure to pay a debt or to h
any protected right resulted in financial difficulty, including the loss of

property to a corporation. It also prevailed regardless of which party su
fered the greater hardship. Perhaps the best indicator of the nature of
contract decisions is that contract operated as an organizing and binding
force even in the context of dispute between a fraternal cooperative an

one of its members. By stating that the relationship among participant
a cooperative was contractual, Doster and Allen appeared to be indicating
that contract was a just way of arranging relations among individuals an
corporations.
Doster and Allen's legal reasoning suggests several characteristics of
the context of Populist reform. Although Populists were serious about

finding means to hold "natural monopolies," such as railroads, to a high
standard of behavior, particularly in the negligence area, their doctrine did
not challenge the idea that established common law principles, such as
the fault standard and freedom of contract, should function as fundamen-

tal sources of private rights and obligations. Moreover, neither Allen nor
Doster ever gave the slightest hint that the corporate form was wrong or
unjust or that cooperatives were a wholly distinct and more desirable
entity. Nor did they try to weaken corporations through radical definitions
of property or contract rights. In contract, Doster repeatedly rejected corpo?
rations' arguments that they lacked the power to make a promise, and
both men were determined supporters of corporate creditors. In short, the
law was not repudiated, even when its effect in some cases could be to
compound differences in wealth and power.
Also revealing is the Court's strong adherence to precedent and the
Rule of Law. If Populism sought to recast fundamentals, obeisance to rules
generated by capitalists and their allies seems strange behavior indeed.
Moreover, Doster and Allen did not choose to make a mockery of law by

reaching results favorable to Populist litigants while claiming to defend
existing rules. If a corporation had both the law and the facts on its side, it
appears to have prevailed. Together, the results and reasoning of the

decisions suggest that Populists did not understand the success of their
political proposals to require a radical reconception of private law.
Contrary to the arguments of some historians, Populism, through Popu?
list law, appears as a moderate shifting of burdens fundamentally accepting of individualism and industrial society, and not a radical attempt to
defeat emerging capitalist relationships. There simply is no evidence that
these Kansas justices, who were genuine Omaha Platform Populists, be-
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lieved their party wanted to undermine the basic legal foundations of a
capitalist economy. The decisions of the Kansas supreme court indicate
that Doster and Allen assumed that, after their party destroyed naturally
monopolistic forms of private ownership, namely private property, free•
dom of contract, and the fault standard would persist. Accordingly, private
corporations, even large corporations, would survive, and unfettered com
petition for economic rewards, albeit in an altered, fairer form, would
continue. Specifically, the law would not affect guarantees of favorable
contract bargains or insure negligent individuals against their own folly. It
would reward persons who made the "right" economic choices. It most
certainly would not impose the kind of "public regulation of exchange"
that Hahn has suggested, or view the "cooperative" as a radically alter
nate means of organizing the economy, as both Hahn and Goodwyn have
argued. Despite their assumption that Populist reforms would defeat the
monopolists and Wall Street and thereby save the smaller producer, the
existing evidence is that Populists believed fundamental economic rela
tionships were best governed by the individual rights and individual obli
gations of existing law.

